House Subcommittee cuts funding for the Modern Pit Facility, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, the Advanced Concepts Initiative and the program to enhance the readiness to return to full-scale, underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site.
NWNM's Press Release regarding the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's letter to the National Nuclear Security Administration, May 25, 2004 [15k]
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board letter to Linton Brooks, Administrator for the National Nuclear Safety Administration [31k]
In this letter the DNFSB describes a number of safety issues related to Technical Area (TA)18 at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). TA-18 is home to the critical experiment facilities at LANL and holds a large amount of both plutonium and uranium. While at other TAs a worst accident could occur only due to a catastrophic event, a worst accident at TA-18 could occur due to operator error.
Points of note:
- TA-18 is located one-half mile from the nearest site boundary and 3 miles from the town of White Rock. The laboratory buildings containing the critical assemblies offer no confinement in the event of an accident with a radiological release.
The postulated accidents in TA-18 with the highest off-site consequences involve uncontrolled reactivity excursions in critical assemblies containing a core or sample of plutonium. ...conservatively calculated, the maximally exposed off-site individual (MEOI) would receive on the order of 1,000 rem committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) unless the accident were mitigated.
- The comparable postulated accident in TA-18 might be initiated by a sequence of operator errors, due to incorrect analysis, incorrect procedures, or failure to follow procedures that would result in an assembly with too much fissile material being assembled in an uncontrolled matter.
- NNSA and LANL are currently relying on a set of administrative controls and interim compensatory measures to prevent this [operator error] accident. These administrative controls appear to be equivalent to safety-class controls, as described in the Board’s Recommendation 2002-3. However, most of these controls are missing from the current list of those to be verified in response to the Board’s Recommendation. It appears that these controls ought to be included and to have priority for verification. The importance of this verification has grown as a result of increased uncertainty regarding TA-18’s mission, the lack of operational oversight, and recent changes in operational management.
Further information:
Nuclear Insecurities - Vanity Fair November 22, 2003 [86k]
For Whom the Whistle Blows - The New Mexican October 19, 2003
DOE Fines LANL Over TA-18 Nuclear Safety Violations - Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement October 9, 2001 |
