



No new bombs

Congress should not fund research, development, testing, or production of weapons with new or improved military capabilities.

The United States maintains a deployed nuclear stockpile of roughly 1,500 warheads and bombs, with 4,500 more in reserve. These weapons are tested and certified reliable and will be for decades to come.

The Trump administration, expanding on the Obama Administration's trillion dollar plan to modernize the US nuclear stockpile, has added proposals for provocative new and/or modified weapons. Some of these systems undermine US nonproliferation efforts, others introduce a perilous element of uncertainty by muddling the distinction between conventional and nuclear delivery systems. All of them, insofar as they introduce new and untested design features, will push the US to resume full-scale nuclear testing—something we have not done since 1992.

They are also each expensive, adding billions to the National Nuclear Security Administration's budget and the burden on taxpayers.

For the past decade, the NNSA has used its Life Extension Program to propose new or highly modified weapons. The W80-4 Long Range Stand-off (LRSO) weapon could be the poster child for expensive and dangerous programs proposed in the Nuclear Posture Review and this year's budget.

- Proposed funding for the LRSO tripled in the FY2019 budget request—to \$654 million.
- This revamped warhead is proposed for a new, dual-use, air-launched cruise missile that can be launched 1,500 miles from its target.
- It is particularly destabilizing because it can fly under radar.
- The target will have no way of

continued on back, column 1

No new bomb plants

Congress should not fund new facilities to manufacture plutonium pits or highly enriched uranium secondaries for warheads or bombs.

PLUTONIUM PITS


Plutonium pits are the triggers for nuclear weapons. The US has not had full-scale pit production capacity since 1989 when an FBI raid investigating environmental crimes shut down the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado. In 1996, production was relocated to the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) but was officially capped at 20 pits per year. On May 11, 2018, the National Nuclear Security Administration announced it will produce up to 30 pits per year at LANL and up to 50 more at the Savannah River Site.

The US has roughly 20,000 pits stored at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas. Independent experts have found that pits last at least a century, and most pits are now around 40 years old. Congress required expanded production in 2015, but has never explained why it is necessary other than as a vague hedge against future risks.

Expanded production is not to maintain safety and reliability of existing nuclear weapons; it is for new nuclear weapons designs. Future pits will not be exact replicas of existing pits, which could push the US back into testing, with obvious proliferation consequences.

Production above 20 pits per year and production at a second site will require nationwide public review under the National Environmental Policy Act. Taxpayers should demand an explanation for costly,

continued on back, column 2



Safer, smarter policies

Congress should restrain the president's authority to launch a nuclear first strike and move to a "no first use" policy.

RESTRICTING FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACT

Under current United States policy, the President has sole authority to order the launch of a first strike nuclear weapons attack. The President is also not required to consult with anyone in the government or military before making such an order.

Senator Ed Markey has introduced the *Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2017—S 200*, and Congressman Ted Lieu has introduced similar legislation in the House—HR 669. This legislation would require a declaration of war from Congress in order to launch a nuclear first strike attack. In doing so, it would assert Congress's constitutional authority as the only body that can declare war and exert a basic check on executive authority in line with our governmental system of check and balances.

This legislation only restricts the President's authority to launch a first strike nuclear attack, and would not apply in the event of a nuclear attack on the US or its allies, or upon learning that such an attack was imminent.

NO FIRST USE POLICY

The United States has no official "no-first-use" policy for nuclear weapons, meaning that it still retains the option of using nuclear weapons in a preemptive or preventative attack, or in response to a non-nuclear attack. This is completely unnecessary. The US has

continued on back, column 3

No new bombs (cont'd)

knowing until it is hit whether the cruise-missile payload is conventional or nuclear.

- The LRSO nuclear weapon is arguably redundant to the B61-12 warhead.

Similar critiques can be made about other weapon systems in the budget pipeline: the Interoperable Warhead (IW), delayed by the Obama Administration (total program cost: \$40 billion) has been resurrected. Proposed as a cross-platform weapon to be used by the Navy and the Air Force, it stumbled in 2012 when the Navy refused to support it.

A huge—and hugely expensive—make-work project for Lawrence Livermore Lab, the IW is the driving force in the multi-billion dollar effort of the NNSA to resume full-scale production of plutonium pits.

Other expensive Life Extension Programs would add billions to the NNSA budget. The FY2019 budget request for modifying of B61 warhead to make it the B61-12, the first “smart” thermonuclear bomb, is \$749 million. The B61 faces strong opposition in European countries where it is now deployed.

The Trump Administration also proposes rapid development of a low-yield, sub-launched missile warhead. If the low-yield weapon is supposed to “limit” the escalation of a nuclear conflict, it is hampered by one inconvenient fact: the target has to decide on a response before it knows whether the incoming warhead is high- or low-yield. A low-yield weapon would still pack a catastrophic destructive force and would release radioactive fallout that could not be contained to the target area. Its name alone might tempt military commanders to use it despite the likelihood that it would provoke a full-scale nuclear response.

These provocative, unnecessary, destabilizing, expensive programs should be cancelled.



UPF CONSTRUCTION SITE

No new bomb plants (cont'd)

provocative, expanded plutonium pit production and should insist that speculative new-design nuclear weapons driving pit production be canceled.

HEU SECONDARIES: THE UPF

In March, the NNSA authorized construction of the Uranium Processing Facility, a plant that will produce thermo-nuclear secondaries for modified, refurbished, and new design nuclear weapons at the Y-12 Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

The UPF project has been plagued with problems from the outset. Rather than build a facility that would meet mission requirements for stockpile maintenance (10 warheads/year), NNSA decided to supersize the UPF to produce 80 warhead cores per year.

Almost immediately, NNSA ran into problems—the first design was scrapped when it was determined the facility was too small; a mistake that cost taxpayers half a billion dollars.

To date, the UPF has cost taxpayers almost \$4 billion. Congress has set a “cap” of \$6.5 billion for the UPF, but there is no reason to imagine that will hold. The FY2019 budget request of \$700 million continues a trajectory of ever-bigger annual budgets.

How much will taxpayers ultimately pay to modernize enriched uranium operations at Y-12? We have no idea, because NNSA and Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander refuse to release baseline schedule and cost estimates.

The UPF is a multi-billion dollar investment that undermines US efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Several years ago, Congress asked NNSA to report on the necessity of replacing secondaries in US warheads and bombs as part of the Life Extension

Program. That report would tell us whether or not the UPF is even needed. Congress should not continue to shovel money into the UPF project until it gets an answer and shares it with the public.

Smarter, safer policies (cont'd)

unparalleled conventional military capability more than adequate to respond to any of these situations. In addition, there is no conceivable situation in which a nuclear first-strike would be morally or militarily justifiable, especially considering that this would likely trigger a larger nuclear exchange and result in the deaths of millions or even billions of people.

Congressman Adam Smith has introduced legislation to establish U.S. policy to not use nuclear weapons first—HR 4415. This extremely simple and sensible bill would update US policy to fit a post-Cold War era.

RECOMMENDATION

Both pieces of legislation reduce the risk of accidents and miscommunications regarding nuclear weapons. There have been multiple times in which incorrect information or miscommunication led either the US or Russia to come within minutes of launching a first strike nuclear attack. These bills greatly reduce this risk, and in doing so, enhance global security. In addition, they reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons under unstable or rash leadership, either now or in the future. Finally, they solidify the sole purpose of nuclear weapons as a deterrent, not as a tool for combat, while still maintaining US flexibility and strength.

We urge all members of Congress to co-sponsor S 200 and HR 669, and all House members to co-sponsor HR 4415.

NUCLEAR POLICIES THAT FIT

The passage by 122 nations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons signals to the US and other nuclear armed states that the days of nuclear weapons are numbered.

Aligning US nuclear policy with the consensus of non-nuclear states will enhance our safety and security now and in the future. Members of Congress, whose budget decisions constrain (or not) US nuclear weapons programs, have a responsibility to consider the trajectory of arms control efforts as they make decisions.

The controlling principle should be policies that enhance our safety and security.