



National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons FY08 Funding

(in millions of dollars)	FY06 appropriated	FY07 requested	FY08 requested
NNSA Office "Nuclear Deterrent" ¹	303.99	323.58	330.67
"Total Weapons Activities" ²	6,355.03	6,407.89	6,511.31
Total NNSA nuclear weapons	6,659.02	6,731.47	6,841.98
Directed Stockpile Work	1,372.33	1,410.27	1,447.24
Reliable Replacement Warhead	24.75	27.71	88.77 ^{3 4}
Life Extension Programs	317.73	312.66	238.69 ⁵
Stockpile Systems	300.72	325.55	346.72
Dismantlements	59.40	75.00	52.25
Stockpile Services	669.73	669.35	720.81
Science Campaigns	276.67	263.76	273.08
Test Readiness	19.80	14.76	0.0
Engineering Campaigns	247.91	160.92	152.75
Inertial Confinement Campaign	543.58	451.19	412.26
National Ignition Facility Const.	140.49	111.42	10.14
NIF Assembly & Installation	101.31	143.44	136.91
Adv. Simulation & Computing	599.77	617.96	585.74
Plutonium Pit Manf. & Cert. Campaign	238.67	237.60	281.23
Consolidated Plutonium Center	0.0	0.0	24.91 ⁶
Readiness Campaign	216.57	205.97	161.17
Readiness in Tech. Base & Facilities	1,654.84	1,685.77	1,662.14
LANL CMR Replacement Project	54.45	112.42	95.59
Y-12 HEU Materials Facility	80.54	21.27	77.00
Total Department of Energy funding for the nuclear weapons laboratories:			
Los Alamos (-1% FY07 to FY08)	1,854.24	1,860.48	1,836.28
Sandia (-9%)	1,482.00	1,389.00	1,270.00
Livermore (-8%)	1,249.17	1,250.53	1,153.29
Total NNSA nuclear weapons funding for the three laboratories:			
Los Alamos (-7%)	1,400.97	1,478.56	1,381.22
Sandia (-7%)	1,153.43	1,047.17	969.42
Livermore (-8%)	1,066.91	1,087.02	1,001.38

NNSA nuclear weapons funding at the production sites (KCP, Pantex, SRS and Y-12) increased \$172.08 million from FY07 to FY08. "Total weapons activities" at NNSA Wash. DC headquarters increased \$216.78 million (separate from NNSA Office of Administrator).

Total DOE New Mexico (-3%)	4,294.33	4,204.34	4,082.94
Total Weapons \$\$ in NM (-6%)	2,788.04	2,741.03	2,577.57

Note: 39.6% of NNSA nuclear weapons funding is to be spent in New Mexico alone.

¹ The NNSA Office defines the goal of "Nuclear Deterrent" as "Transform the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure to be more responsive to the threats of the 21st Century."

² Some budget subcategories under "Total Weapons Activities" are omitted.

³ NNSA will ask for a RRW budget adjustment in late FY07, which will probably add \$\$.

⁴ The Navy has requested \$30 million for RRW in the FY08 Department of Defense budget and says it will request \$50 million in FY09 (\$22 million and \$34.5 million will be spent at NNSA sites).

⁵ NNSA explicitly states that it will pay for unproven Reliable Replacement Warheads by cutting back on Life Extension Programs for existing tested nuclear weapons that are known to be reliable.

⁶ Proposed plutonium manufacturing/R&D center for RRW pits. Requested funding is double that of the previously defeated "Modern Pit Facility." NNSA plans to seek construction funding in FY10.

Some Comments and Analyses

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is proceeding willy-nilly with the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). NNSA is essentially trading in our already extensively tested nuclear weapons stockpile for future untested designs, in order to meet unspecified “emerging threats” without explaining why existing nuclear weapons could not meet them. Any discussion or analysis of how new-design U.S. nuclear weapons and resumed industrial-scale production could provide a negative non-proliferation example to the world is entirely absent. In contrast, RRW permeates the entire NNSA Fiscal Year 2008 Congressional Budget Request for nuclear weapons.

NNSA explicitly states that it will ask for a “budget adjustment” in late FY07 for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), which no doubt will cost more money. Within the Department of Defense budget the Navy has requested \$30 million for RRW in 2008, and states that it will ask for \$50 million in FY09. These DoD RRW costs add to NNSA’s costs, and some appear to be for traditional NNSA tasks (arming, fuzing & firing) and will be spent at NNSA sites. Enhanced Surveillance, arguably the subprogram most directly related to guaranteeing stockpile safety and reliability, is being continually cut. NNSA is already funding a Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC) while the Complex 2030 Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement is still only in its scoping phase. We believe it probable that by design or default LANL will become the nation’s permanent plutonium pit production center.

Related, the small drop in requested funding FY08 for the Chemical and Metallurgical Research Replacement Project (CCMR; an advanced plutonium facility) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory is because NNSA and the Lab have decided to not proceed with the “nuclear facility” in FY08. They are proceeding with “light labs” and office space. NNSA says the overall schedule of total CMRR completion in 2014 will not be affected.

This small drop is not good news and is, in fact, ominous. The reason they are not proceeding with CMRR’s nuclear facility is because they want to slow down and evaluate how it will fit into Complex 2030.

Nuclear Watch New Mexico has argued for a couple of years now that LANL will probably become the nation’s permanent pit production center, largely by default. CMRR’s pending re-scoping of mission is symptomatic of this. CMRR could likely take on a direct pit production role, instead of just providing the crucial supporting role of plutonium accounting and characterization. CMRR is contiguous to the Lab’s ~40 year old plutonium pit production facility at Technical Area-55. We previously prepared a composite map of a potentially expanded TA-55 in our formal comments to NNSA on Complex 2030, p. 10, at http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/BomplexScopingComments_011707.pdf

We were initially puzzled how key NNSA site offices (e.g. Los Alamos, Sandia, Livermore, Savannah River Site) could report no nuclear weapons funding since FY06. After digging we found that the NNSA Office of the Administrator has requested \$394,656,000 for FY08, and out of that \$330,674,000 is explicitly devoted to the strategic goal of “Nuclear Deterrent.” Nuclear Deterrent is defined as “Transform the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure to be more responsive to the threats of the 21st century.” (NNSA FY08 request, Volume 1, p. 36.) This funding is to be spent both at NNSA office in Washington DC and the site offices.

That \$330,674,000 is not included in the NNSA’s FY08 request of \$6,545,312,000 for “Total Weapons Activities.” We argue that it should be, and as a result **the real NNSA request for its nuclear weapons programs is \$6,908,986,000.**

The NNSA's FY08 Congressional Budget Request suggests that the nuclear weapons complex is increasingly shifting to production. The three design labs took a \$261 million hit to their nuclear weapons programs, and the Nevada Test Site \$18 million (all together \$279 million). However, the four production plants (Y-12, Pantex, KCP & SRS) had their combined requests rise \$172 million over FY07. (Y-12 went up 12.6% and Pantex 10.0%!). Nuclear weapons activities at NNSA Washington DC headquarters (this is separate from the Office of the Administrator) went from \$275.32 million in FY07 to \$492.10 million requested for FY08, a \$216.78 million or 78.74% jump!

After a careful search, we have found no budget line items for "Complex 2030" and the NNSA's Office of Transformation. [However, the \$24.9 million for the Consolidated Plutonium Center under the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign is entirely related and very significant.] We strongly suspect (but cannot prove) that accelerating complex transformation work will be taking place funded in part by the money under the NNSA Office of the Administrator mentioned above. It could also be funded in part by the added \$216.78 million in nuclear weapons money at NNSA DC HQ. In any event, we think that the huge jump in nuclear weapons money at NNSA HQ is highly indicative of accelerating complex transformation, in combination with the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program.

Relatively small amounts of nuclear weapons money are found at some Department of Energy (DOE) sites that may be surprising, e.g. Brookhaven and Hanford. In many cases, but not all, that money is for "Nuclear Weapons Incident Response," presumably the emergency teams and support that would be dispatched were a nuclear weapon to be found in the U.S.

For a breakdown of NNSA nuclear weapons funding at individual Department of Energy sites see http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/NNSA_NuclearWeaponsFundingBySite.pdf

FY08 NNSA Congressional Budget Request for Nuclear Weapons, Volume 1
http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/08budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NNSA.pdf

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