

*"float like a butterfly, bite like a dawg"*

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<http://www.nukewatch.org>

## New Arms Reduction Treaty! Where's the Reduction?

The Bush Administration and the press made big news out of the "U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty" of May 24, 2002. There is, however, very little to applaud the Administration for. Though Bush stated that this new treaty "liquidates the Cold War legacy," it does nothing of the kind. It is merely a ploy by the White House to falsely convince Americans that Bush is fulfilling his campaign pledge to reduce America's nuclear weapons stockpile while implementing the expanded nuclear targeting policies found in the new Nuclear Posture Review (please see our April Special Bulletin on the NPR).

The new treaty is riddled with loopholes that will allow both nations to maintain their current stockpile of nuclear weapons. The treaty calls for the reduction and limitation of strategic nuclear warheads so that the aggregate number does not exceed 1,700-2,200 for each nation. This limitation must be met by December 31, 2012. However, there is no clause that will ensure a verifiable phased reduction of warheads over the duration of the treaty. This means that both nations are under no obligations to actually reduce the number of weapons until the 31<sup>st</sup> of December, 2012, the same day the treaty ends. Furthermore, a three-month notice of intent to withdraw is permitted. Combining this with the lack of verified and enforced

phased reductions, either nation can theoretically submit a notice of intent to withdraw in August 2012, thereby avoiding all treaty obligations and never reducing nuclear weapons arsenals at all.

Additional flaws in the treaty include the failure to require permanent destruction of the warheads or delivery systems. Rather than destroying the warheads, Bush has ordered that they will be pulled off the delivery systems and placed into a "responsive reserve." These warheads can easily be



placed back on the delivery systems, which defeats the purpose of irreversible disarmament. The treaty is also a major step backwards from the aggressive measures that were included in the past START II agreement. START II required the verifiable reduction of both nations' nuclear arsenals to around 3,500 deployed warheads on each side, including the complete elimination of some of the most dangerous weapons systems, specifically land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with multiple independently targeted warheads. The new Bush and Putin agreement makes the elimination of these weapons systems optional.

A complete omission is its failure to incorporate a plan to secure Russian nuclear weapons materials. Due to its economic woes, the security of Russian nuclear materials remains dangerously poor. Reports indicate that al-Qaida has attempted to buy stolen Russian nuclear materials from the black market. Despite this, the treaty fails to institutionalize an enhanced security program for Russian nuclear weapons materials. Finally, it does nothing to prevent either power from developing more advanced nuclear weapons, something the U.S. is now doing with its Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (see related article).

The world has seen India and Pakistan reach the brink of yet another war, this time a war that could very likely include nuclear weapons, causing the deaths of tens of millions of people on the Indian sub-continent. Moreover, indications are that the U.S. is threatened by terrorist organizations who actively seek weapons of mass destruction. Yet, the Bush Administration makes no real effort to lead by example by irreversibly reducing the massive U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, nor by helping to ensure the security of Russian nuclear weapons materials.

To read the text of the treaty, go to the U.S. State Department's web site at [www.state.gov/t/ac/trty/10527.htm](http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trty/10527.htm).

-- Colin King

# NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR: your tax dollars fund the new nightmare

In January 2002 the Department of Defense released a new **Nuclear Posture Review** (NPR) (for a summary, please see [www.nukewatch.org/nwd/nprbulletin.pdf](http://www.nukewatch.org/nwd/nprbulletin.pdf)). Previously, the Clinton administration had expanded nuclear targeting policy from being deterrence only against potential nuclear threats to also include perceived biological and chemical threats. Now, in addition to the already targeted Russia and China, the Bush Administration's NPR includes the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear attacks against North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya for suspected chemical and biological weapons facilities.

Related to all of this, the NPR is explicitly calling for the development of **low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons** designed to destroy underground, reinforced facilities. Congruently, the 2003 DOE budget requests funding for the development of a "**Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator**" (RNEP). This nuclear weapon would most likely be a modification of an existing weapon (by using a modification the US can avoid international censure for a "new" nuclear weapon). Since a low-yield weapon can be created by disabling some features of an original design DOE can also circumvent a 1994 congressional law barring research into "mininukes" (nuclear weapons with less than a 5 kiloton yield). DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration has already formed "red teams" at the two nuclear weapons design labs, Los Alamos in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore in California, to actively engage in RNEP modifications. The urgent danger here is that low-yield nuclear weapons are inherently more "usable" and can severely erode international norms against the use of weapons of mass destruction. But can a RNEP really work as advertised?

## Problems with the RNEP:

- The RNEP was originally portrayed as a low-yield nuclear weapon. However, the Federation of American Scientists has published a authoritative study demonstrating the physical impossibility of penetrating deeply enough underground to avoid **widespread collateral damage, contamination and fallout**. Largely because of its limited penetrating capabilities, DOE has recently testified to Congress that it is no longer specifically seeking a low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapon. Instead, it seeks to modify two existing bombs, the B61 and B83, with upper yields in the hundreds of kilotons, **many times the destructive power of bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki**. In combination, the notion that a RNEP can somehow be a "clean" nuclear weapon for "surgical" use as initially advertised is a dangerous and provocative myth.

- The United States does not need to develop a RNEP as it already possesses conventional "bunker-busters." While these weapons also have limited penetrating capabilities and

are far less destructive than nuclear weapons, they can be "laddered" in by using a number of weapons in succession to destroy a hardened, deeply buried target without the use of a nuclear weapon. Any effort that helps to encourage crossing the nuclear threshold is foolhardy indeed and acts against our own national security interests!

- Tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons (as the RNEP would be) are the most prone to **potential theft and use by terrorists** because of their relative compactness and lower security. There are already fears that terrorists could have acquired a Russian "suitcase" bomb. Clearly the U.S. would have an adverse impact on global efforts to control tactical nuclear weapons by pursuing a new one of its own.

- Extensive design changes to an existing weapon while developing the RNEP could precipitate a **return to full-scale nuclear testing**. If the U.S. tested, surely other countries would follow. The collapse of the international testing moratorium would have a long-term, strongly negative impact on our own national security and global security in general.

- The U.S. has sent delegations at the highest levels to India and Pakistan to press for the avoidance of nuclear war in South Asia. Plans and funding for the RNEP constitute a quest by the U.S. for a more "usable" nuclear weapon while, at the same time, the U.S. and others are essentially telling India and Pakistan not to use nuclear weapons. The international community, and particularly the U.S. in its leadership role, needs to make logical and consistent sense while working globally to prevent nuclear war.

- Finally, if the RNEP is not "clean," low-yield nor very penetrating, why fund it? Is it just more make-work for the nuclear weapons design labs at the very moment when we should be cleaning up our own mess and ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction?

Fortunately, at the time of this writing, the Armed Services Committees has recommended that funding for the RNEP be deleted in the Senate's 2003 National Defense Authorization Act. For that New Mexico's own Senator Bingaman deserves heartfelt thanks. However, New Mexico's senior Senator Domenici is on record as enthusiastically supporting the RNEP as just "another weapon in the war against terrorism." The question needs to be asked how a nuclear weapon that will be neither low-yield nor with "limited collateral damage" can be possibly used against terrorists. This is especially true when a global effort against terrorism requires international cooperation, an effort that any use of nuclear weapons would completely disrupt.

-- Jay Coghlan



## DAWG BITES



The DOE's Inspector General's Office estimates that by the time LANL produces its first grapefruit-size plutonium pit for the stockpile it will have cost \$1.7 billion. Let's see, the cost in solid gold for a 15 pound sphere (roughly comorable to an average plutonium pit) would be around \$70,000. [Maybe we could save ourselves some \$\$ by bombing our enemies with gold pits and buying them off.] Meanwhile, because pit production at the lab would be limited to under 80 per year (probably a good idea so that LANL doesn't bankrupt us), DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration has announced that it will be building a "Modern Pit Facility," most likely in South Carolina. That facility will be capable of producing up to 500 pits per year, comparable to historic Cold War rates!

When asked about the possibility of nuclear war between India and Pakistan, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell recently replied: "... the thought of nuclear conflict in the year 2002 - with what that would mean with respect to loss of life, what that would mean with respect to the condemnation, the worldwide condemnation that would come down on whatever nation chose to take that course of action...I can see very little military, political, or any other kind of justification for the use of nuclear weapons... to think of using them as just another weapon in what might start out as a conventional conflict in this day and age, seems to me to be something that no side should be contemplating." Meanwhile, the U.S. has begun planning for a more "usable" Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (please see related article).

More broadly, the Bush Administration is developing new military doctrine that moves away from mere deterrence toward a policy that supports pre-emptive attacks (possibly including the use of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator) against perceived threats of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the new Bush/Putin treaty does nothing to halt the ongoing advancement of nuclear weapons (please see related article).

Yucca Mountain: The vote to allow high-level radioactive waste to be transported from around the country and dumped at the Yucca Mountain Site in Nevada will be coming to the Senate in early July. There are still hundreds of unanswered scientific questions. Furthermore, DOE has yet to announce specific transportation routes, much less prepare risk analyses for them. Finally there are serious seismic concerns. On Friday June 14th, a 4.4 Richter scale quake hit near the Yucca Mountain site. Please see our "To Do" section to see how you can help!

## I N M E M O R I A M

### Joseph Goldfield

This Denver, Colorado, engineer and scientist with a deep ethical sense and commitment passed away after a long struggle with cancer on May 24. He was long an activist on cleanup issues at the Rocky Flats Plant. In 1989 Joe played a key role in defeating radioactive incineration at Los Alamos. He offered expert opinion at a New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) hearing on the systemic failures of DOE's air emissions filters to capture the percentage of radioactive particulates that DOE claimed. As a partial result NMED imposed operating conditions on LANL's proposed incinerator. In turn, DOE sued NMED, but NMED won and then won again when DOE appealed. In the end, in the face of political and regulatory opposition, the lab dropped its plans for radioactive incineration.


### The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the "cornerstone of nuclear arms control," passed away on June 13, six months after the announcement by President Bush that the U.S. would unilaterally withdraw from the treaty. This now paves the way for National Missile Defense (NMD, a.k.a. "Star Wars"), which may lead to the militarization of space (for more, please see *Watchdog* volume 2, issue 3). On June 14, Russia reciprocated by saying it was no longer bound by the 1993 START II Treaty that banned land-based multiple-warhead missiles, an especially destabilizing class of nuclear weapons. Do you feel more secure now with NMD moving forward?




# A Decade of Misplaced Funding Priorities at Los Alamos!

## LANL Nuclear Weapons vs. Cleanup Programs Budgets



## Close-up of LANL Cleanup Program Budgets



It comes as no surprise that Los Alamos National Laboratory's (LANL) nuclear weapons budget will continue to climb if Congress approves the DOE's 2003 budget request. What is a surprise is a comparison of budgets over the past decade which demonstrates how highly the Lab prioritizes its nuclear weapons programs over cleanup. In 2002 dollars, LANL's nuclear weapons budget has risen by 172% from its \$443.85 million low in 1991, two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Lab's 2003 request for its nuclear weapons programs is \$1.208 billion, 80% of its total DOE funding.

Meanwhile, important non-weapons programs at the Lab get slashed year after year. Funding for LANL's Environmental Restoration (cleanup) program has dropped by 70% since its high of \$101.84 million in 1994, and is roughly equal to the 1991 funding level (\$29.63 million requested in 2003). On a general note, in 1995 the DOE Inspector General released an audit that found that out of more than \$350 million spent by the Lab for cleanup only 20% had gone to actual cleanup. The rest went to studies and administration. Additionally, please note that cleanup funding continued to decline even after the Cerro Grande Fire that dramatically raised the potential for contamination migration.

The Environmental Restoration program is tasked with the cleanup of contaminated soil and groundwater found all across the laboratory. A growing body of evidence indicates that portions of this contamination is, or soon will be, threatening water in the area, which could have grave consequences for human health and the environment.

For more information please go to [www.nukewatch.org](http://www.nukewatch.org).

-- Colin King

# NMED Issues LANL Order, But Signs Pact with DOE

On May 2 the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) issued a "Determination of Imminent and Substantial Endangerment to Health and the Environment" against Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). At the same time, NMED issued a draft Corrective Action Order requiring the lab to fulfill very extensive environmental data requests. First, the bad news on the order. It clearly should have been issued more than a decade ago, a fact which NMED officials don't dispute. Moreover, this order is essentially a gloried information request (albeit with legal force) and, most seriously, does not require actual cleanup. The good news is that NMED has finally comprehensively ordered the lab to do something, in effect putting itself in the driver's seat rather than condoning the lab's endless procrastination. The draft order does propose stringent residential standards for cleanup. It should also help institutionalize more aggressive regulatory performance by NMED and should lead to real cleanup.

But all is not rosy. At the same time that NMED was issuing its determination and order it was also negotiating with the feds for some of DOE's so-called "expedited cleanup" funds. In its 2003 budget request DOE carved out for itself \$800 million in what is arguably a slush fund (whether Congress actually appropriates it remains to be seen). DOE created that fund by cutting cleanup across the country, for example by 27 percent at LANL alone.

DOE is now attempting to dole that money back out to the various sites on its own terms. For cleanup at LANL, in DOE's mind that means the use of "industrial" cleanup standards, far more lax than residential standards. It also means "stabilization in place" (i.e., leave buried waste buried) and "institutional controls" (i.e., build fences to keep the public out so that less cleanup has to be done). It further means accelerated shipments of the Lab's radioactive WIPP wastes, which are already stored (not buried) and monitored. This can then put DOE in the future position of having moved those wastes to WIPP (which are less than 3 percent of the Lab's total radioactive wastes) and then falsely claiming that the lab is cleaned up. As explicitly stated by DOE, all of this is to "allow the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) focus to remain on its core national security mission" at LANL, which means its expanding nuclear weapons programs (please see related graphs). In order to apply for that additional funding NMED had to agree (at least on paper) to these principles in a recently signed Letter of Intent.

Additionally, the University of California (LANL's manager) has now sued NMED in federal court seeking to overturn the determination of imminent and substantial endangerment. If successful, UC could then probably stop NMED from implementing its order. UC will enjoy a virtually limitless supply of taxpayers' dollars while suing New Mexico. The main point of UC's argument is that NMED doesn't have

authority over radioactive materials. It is true that DOE is exempted from regulatory oversight over purely radioactive materials by the Atomic Energy Act. However, two federal environmental laws, the Resource and Recovery Conservation Act (RCRA) and the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, together grant regulatory authority over mixed wastes (i.e., both hazardous and radioactive) to EPA. In turn, EPA has delegated RCRA authority to the states. Thus, NMED has a good chance of fending off UC's lawsuit.

But there is a yet larger process going on. LANL's RCRA permit expired in 1998 (RCRA essentially governs the handling, treatment and disposal of solid wastes, both hazardous and mixed). NMED, as the permit grantor, has long delayed in issuing the initial chapters of the new permit. The Environment Department has now tied the release of those first chapters to the finalizing of its draft order, now expected in October. Indeed, NMED has indicated that some elements of its order could be incorporated into the LANL RCRA permit, which does raise some serious issues. RCRA requires a full public process that allows for public comment and hearings. In contrast, NMED issued its determination and order in a self-proclaimed "voluntary" manner that allows for public comment but fails to create a legal record. Under this structure the citizens of New Mexico would essentially just have to trust NMED's good intentions, which could change with the governor's election in November.

**Where Nukewatch stands:** It's a mix. It is very good that the NMED has finally issued a comprehensive order that requires LANL to provide integrated environmental information that could well lead to real cleanup. We hope that this truly institutionalizes aggressive regulatory performance within NMED, one that survives successive state administrations. At the same time, we are troubled that the Environment Department could be co-opted by DOE through its application for DOE "expedited cleanup" funds. It is essential that citizens stand up for cleanup to "residential" standards versus "industrial" standards. We are also troubled by the lack of official record and hearings on the order itself.

Nevertheless, we urge citizens to comment on NMED's draft order (available at [www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/pub-notice.html](http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/HWB/pub-notice.html)) by July 31. Most of the order can be ignored (the great bulk concerns specifics related to collecting environmental data). However, particular attention should be paid to "Cleanup and Screening Levels," which may well determine the quality of future cleanup at LANL. Check out [www.nukewatch.org](http://www.nukewatch.org) in mid-July for our comments. Finally, it will take ongoing citizen pressure to hold NMED's feet to the fire so that it faithfully carries out its order and translates it without interminable delay into real cleanup at the lab.



-- Jay Coghlan

# INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING

Nukewatch and the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (BREDL) of North Carolina worked together to bring to light a scheme formed by an international consortium of nukemeisters to bring an unknown quantity of powdered plutonium oxide to Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) from the United Kingdom. Based on documents dated as recently as February 2002, obtained by BREDL through the Freedom of Information Act, LANL will refine up to 250 pounds of polished plutonium from the British plutonium oxide. The Lab will then ship it back across the Atlantic to Dessel, Belgium. There, this plutonium will be fabricated into test mixed oxide (MOX) plutonium reactor fuel. Once fuel fabrication is completed, the consortium will once again ship it across the Atlantic to the McGuire nuclear power plant in North Carolina. At McGuire the fuel will be "burned" as one of the first MOX fuel nuclear power plants.

One reason for concern over all of this shipping and re-shipping is because of the dangerous nature of powdered plutonium oxide. If an accident were to occur, it could become respirable like dust. Studies have shown that only a few tens of *micrograms* (millionths of a gram) of plutonium in the lungs results in a high likelihood of cancer.

The broader issue at stake is the use of MOX fuel as a final path for disposing of excess weapons-grade plutonium. In previous years the Department of Energy had been on two tracks to dispose of 34 metric tonnes of excess plutonium: 1) the MOX fuel program; and 2) immobilization, which involves placing the plutonium in glass while "poisoning" it with highly radioactive materials in order to prevent re-use. Immobilization promised to be the safer, quicker, and more proliferation-resistant method to get rid of these dangerous materials. However, in 2003 DOE nixed any funding for immobilization; hence MOX is now the only "disposal" method. This will inevitably raise more waste issues, proliferation concerns and will introduce plutonium to international commerce.


It is astonishing that the U.S. has to get plutonium from the U.K. for test purposes to begin with. The documents obtained by BREDL state that out of the U.S.'s 34 tonnes, *no* material was adequate for MOX fuel testing. This is very significant to the state of South Carolina where DOE is intending to ship most of its excess plutonium to produce MOX fuel at the Savannah River Site. In May, the Governor of South Carolina sued DOE in order to block all shipments of plutonium into the state until there is a binding agreement that the plutonium will leave South Carolina in one form or another. Now it is clear that extensive waste-producing

processes will have to be undertaken in South Carolina in order to strip the plutonium of impurities before any "exit strategy" can be implemented for these excess 34 tonnes.

For more information, please see our press release at: [www.nukewatch.org/nwd/pressRelease06-12-02.pdf](http://www.nukewatch.org/nwd/pressRelease06-12-02.pdf).

-- Jay Coghlan and Geoff Petrie

**Postscript:** On June 13 a federal judge barred the Governor of South Carolina from blocking DOE plutonium shipments. Presumably, those shipments will soon take place. Additionally, in response to inquiries by *The New Mexican* a DOE official acknowledged that LANL will be polishing plutonium for test MOX fuel, but claimed that the lab would be using its own plutonium. She also stated that DOE has not decided where the test fuel will be fabricated, but declined to discuss Belgium or other alternatives. She did confirm that the fuel would eventually be sent to the McGuire nuclear power plant. LANL officials declined to comment at all.



Jamie Chase

## Who Needs Inspections? The Department of Energy Wants You to Trust Them!

At a recent meeting of the New Mexico Radioactive Waste Consultation Task Force the DOE Carlsbad Field Office reported on its proclaimed “successes” with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and its future plans. DOE stated that it intends to accelerate “cleanup” throughout the US nuclear weapons complex, in turn changing WIPP’s scheduled closure date from 2035 to 2016. This will inevitably require the doubling of waste shipments. This is wishful thinking on the part of DOE. Due to many problems it has trouble maintaining its current maximum of 20 shipments a week. One way DOE hopes to get itself out of this jam is by reducing the thoroughness of state highway inspections at New Mexican ports-of-entry.

Almost all present WIPP shipments are coming from the Rocky Flats Plant outside of Denver, Colorado, and the Idaho National Environmental Engineering Laboratory. Because these sites are north of New Mexico, these shipments are coming through the Raton port-of-entry on I-25. DOE dislikes the fact that New Mexico carefully inspects all incoming WIPP shipments. These inspections are performed as a “North American Inspection Level VI.” That level was specifically designed in 1986 to “develop a standard which will ensure the protection and safety of people and the environment by setting and enforcing rigid inspection standards and safeguards for the transportation of radioactive materials.”

DOE disputes the need for Level VI inspections because they naturally take more time than routine inspections. DOE is worried that if shipments are increased WIPP waste trucks will be bottlenecked while waiting for inspections. So what is DOE’s proposed solution? Reduce the stringency of inspections to a Level I or a Level III inspection while having only a ran-

dom number (around 1 in 14) inspected at Level VI. In a Level I inspection the inspector quickly checks paper work, the driver and the vehicle so that all appears well. A Level I inspection would typically take between 20-45 minutes. A Level III inspection is even more lax, where only a driver “inspection” takes place. If the driver has his license, the proper paper work and doesn’t appear intoxicated the shipment may proceed. The irony is that in the month before DOE proposed dropping from a Level VI inspection to a Level I or III, the New Mexico Department of Public Safety found seven Level VI infractions at the Raton port-of-entry. This is no laughing matter as those trucks still have over 300 miles to go before they reach WIPP!



If DOE had any generosity at all it could easily solve its potential bottleneck at New Mexican ports-of-entry. The federal budget for WIPP will likely be increased by \$20 million. With this kind of money, a fraction of it could go to helping support more state inspectors. If shipments are increased more inspectors are badly need-

ed simply to prevent increased radioactive exposure to any one individual inspector. It is, after all, DOE who is causing these exposures to begin with.

There is simply no need to decrease the level of inspection at New Mexican ports-of-entry. DOE likes to brag that it performs above and beyond the *required* level of safety and inspection. Why is it treating port-of-entry inspections differently!? The Level VI inspection was specifically created to help ensure public safety. DOE should be expected to abide by strict inspections in any given state, especially in New Mexico.

What can you do about this? Please see “What to Do!” on the back page!

--Geoff Petrie

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### mission statement

The mission of Nuclear Watch New Mexico is to provide timely and accurate information to the public on nuclear issues in the American Southwest, and to encourage effective citizen involvement and activism in these issues. We seek to promote greater environmental protection, safe disposition of radioactive wastes, and federal policy changes that will curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Inside this issue: Arms Reduction that Isn't; International Plutonium Trafficking; WIPP Update; Earth-Penetrating Nukes; LANL Budget Shocker; NMED Cuts Deal with DOE; In Memoriam; and more!

## What To Do!

If you haven't yet, please call your senators and tell them what you think of the proposed Yucca Mountain Site for high-level radioactive waste (spent reactor fuel)! Call the Capitol Switchboard at 1-202-224-3121; they'll direct you to your senator.

Check out <http://www.mapscience.org> and see how close you are to the proposed Yucca Mountain high-level nuclear waste shipping routes.

Call Anne Clark, Coordinator for the New Mexico Radioactive Waste Consultation Task Force (505-476-3224) and tell her that you do not want WIPP shipments to have less than a Level VI inspection at New Mexico ports-of-entry (please see related article).

Nukewatch tries to work for the betterment of New Mexico and the US at large. Please help support us by sending donations. They are tax deductible!

Save paper by going to <http://www.nukewatch.org> and sign on to our electronic mailing list. You will receive all of our newsletters, postcards, and fact sheets, and you save a tree while staying active!

Thank Senator Bingaman (505/988-6647) for opposing development of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and inserting language into the 2003 Defense Authorization Act that deletes funding for it until the Pentagon offers full justification. Tell Senator Domenici (505/988-6511), who describes this nuclear weapon as just "another weapon in the war against terrorism," that you oppose it too!

Submit comments on the New Mexico Environment Department's draft LANL corrective action order by July 31 (please see related article). Come mid-July, check out our comments at [www.nukewatch.org](http://www.nukewatch.org) for tips.

### nuclear watch new mexico

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