Published 2/8/24 in the Federal Register at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-02-08/pdf/2024-02513.pdf
Pre-published at: https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-02513.pdf
Page numbers below are from that. All excerpts are verbatim.
DNFSB Recommendation 2003-01
Onsite Transportation Safety
[TSD = “Transportation Safety Document”
MAR = “Materials at Risk”, typically plutonium]
Page 2: however, more work is necessary to ensure the LANL TSD appropriately identifies all hazards, analyzes all pertinent accident scenarios, and evaluates the effectiveness of all credited safety controls.
3: the risk remains that LANL or other defense nuclear sites may regress to inadequate TSDs that fail to provide an effective set of safety controls
4: These safety issues are particularly concerning given the high material-at-risk (MAR) allowed by the TSD, the proximity of LANL’s onsite transportation routes to the public, and the nature of several credible accident scenarios. These factors result in high calculated unmitigated dose consequences to the public without an adequate safety control strategy.
5: The Board identified four primary safety concerns with the DOE directives related to onsite transportation. First, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not contain all applicable requirements from 10 CFR 830; therefore, they do not ensure that TSDs meet all 10 CFR 830 requirements.
6: Second, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not provide specific criteria against which to deterministically evaluate the effectiveness of the safety control set, leading to an incomplete understanding of the risk of onsite transportation operations.
7: Third, the onsite transportation safe harbors do not provide guidance on methods to control public access during onsite transfers conducted under TSDs. Restricting public access is important from both regulatory and safety perspectives, because onsite transfers may use roads open to the public. If public access is not properly restricted, the public could be closer to onsite transportation activities than intended. Members of the public could initiate an accident (e.g., vehicle crash) and could receive a higher radiation dose by being in the vicinity of a transport accident if a release occurred.
7: Finally, DOE Standard 1104-2016, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis Documents, does not contain specific guidance for federal review and approval of TSDs. As a result, DOE oversight personnel do not have specific criteria to evaluate whether a TSD ensures safety and complies with the onsite transportation safe harbors, as they would have for a DOE Standard 3009-compliant DSA.
8: DOE Oversight—DOE and NNSA failed to independently identify deficiencies in the onsite transportation safe harbors and the LANL TSD. Additionally, DOE and NNSA did not ensure that timely corrective actions were taken when the Board identified transportation safety concerns and have struggled to resolve safety concerns when collaboration across program offices is required.
8: Additionally, NNSA did not resolve safety issues with the LANL TSD. In 2007, an NNSA safety basis review team identified several of the safety issues discussed in this Recommendation. Personnel from the NNSA Packaging Certification Division, who were part of the safety basis review team, “concluded that the TSD as submitted did not provide an adequate level of analysis to support the conclusions that for non DOT compliant packages the overall transport system provided an equivalent level of safety” [6]. To address these issues, NA-LA directed the contractor to provide quantitative analysis, which was included in subsequent revisions of the TSD. However, in Revision 9, which became effective in November 2012, the LANL management and operating contractor completely rewrote the safety analysis, removing the quantitative analysis.
9: The Board brought the safety concerns with the LANL TSD and the onsite transportation safe harbors to DOE’s attention in its January 6, 2022, letter; however, DOE did not take timely action to address them. It took more than a year for LANL to implement any compensatory measures to address the Board’s safety concerns.
10: In summary, DOE’s historical management of the safe harbors for onsite transportation of radioactive materials and the LANL TSD in particular indicates deficiencies in DOE’s ability, as the regulatory authority, to recognize transportation safety issues and ensure that timely action is taken to address them.
12-13: TSDs that are developed following this methodology may not contain sufficient analysis to establish appropriate hazard controls. This issue is illustrated by the LANL TSD. The LANL TSD does not provide adequate analysis to demonstrate that significant public consequences are not credible and does not identify and analyze various credible hazards.
14: the current LANL TSD allows for transfers of up to 1.9 kg Pu-239 equivalent without either a package or enclosed cargo compartment. The Area G TRU waste transportation and fire accident scenario is just one of many potential onsite transportation accidents at LANL involving significant MAR quantities. From discussions with NNSA Los Alamos Field Office (NA-LA) personnel, the Board understands that LANL averages between 30 and 40 shipments of hazard category 2 quantities5 of material per year.
14: 5 This term comes from DOE Standard 1027-1992, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. This standard determines which of four hazard categories—1, 2, 3, or less than 3—applies to a facility, based on the amount of nuclear material it contains. In this case, a hazard category 2 quantity equates to approximately 1 kg or more of plutonium-239, or equivalent.
14: Given the high dose consequence and likelihood of potential accident scenarios for onsite transportation of radioactive materials at LANL, together with the lack of analysis in the LANL TSD to show the effectiveness of safety controls, the Board has determined this recommendation is justified and necessary from a risk perspective.
18: Cliffs Along Transportation Routes—The LANL TSD acknowledges that packages used for onsite transportation may not survive a 30-foot drop and states additional controls are identified to compensate. Many onsite transfers at LANL occur along the Pajarito corridor, a specific section of Pajarito Road on the LANL footprint near facilities such as Area G, the Plutonium Facility, and the Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF). There are steep cliffs along one side of the road, with drops of significantly more than 30 feet in some locations. However, the LANL TSD makes no mention of the specific hazard of the cliffs
22: The LANL TSD, with its brief description of events and list of controls, does not constitute formal accident analysis and therefore does not clearly demonstrate alignment with requirements in 10 CFR 830.
24: Significant Public Consequences—As previously discussed, the LANL TSD does not adequately identify all potential hazards, does not adequately analyze accident scenarios, and does not demonstrate the effectiveness of its safety control set. These safety issues are particularly concerning given the high MAR limits, the proximity of transportation routes to the offsite public, and the nature of several credible accident scenarios (e.g., vehicle fire events). These factors result in the possibility of high unmitigated dose consequences to the offsite public.
25: The MAR limit within the November 2012 to June 2023 versions of the LANL TSD was based on “an analysis of historical and potential future operations,” with a review of several years of data of onsite transfers, and the “maximum amount of material transferred during this time frame was approximately 18 kg Pu-239 equivalent material” [17], thus the “MAR limit of 20 kg Pu-239 equivalent is bounding for historical operations, and is expected to be bounding for future operations”…. Other sites’ TSDs contain much lower MAR limits than LANL’s. For example, LLNL and NNSS both specify a MAR limit of 5 kg Pu-239 equivalent.
26: Current Compensatory Measures—Given the deficiencies in the LANL TSD, it cannot be relied upon to ensure adequate protection of the public or workers during onsite transportation activities. Therefore, until the LANL TSD is revised to address the above safety concerns and/or is revised to comply with an improved safe harbor methodology, compensatory measures are warranted to ensure safety.
39: 3. DOE Oversight. DOE and NNSA failed to identify safety deficiencies in both the DOE directives related to onsite transportation and the LANL TSD. Additionally, DOE and NNSA neglected to ensure that timely corrective actions were taken when the Board identified safety concerns and have struggled to resolve safety concerns when collaboration across program offices is required.
41: NNSA Oversight of the LANL TSD—In addition to DOE’s failure to correct the safety deficiencies in the transportation directives, NNSA has not resolved safety issues with the LANL TSD specifically. NA-LA and NNSA headquarters packaging and transportation organizations have had multiple opportunities throughout the years to do so, and yet lasting corrective actions were not taken.
42: DOE Oversight of Identified Safety Issues—Even after the Board expressed safety concerns with the LANL TSD and the onsite transportation safe harbors in its January 6, 2022, letter to the Secretary of Energy, DOE did not take timely action to address these safety concerns.