“It is long past time for Congress to reinvigorate our oversight of nuclear weapons policies. In this Essay, I will argue that Congress has been overly deferential to claims from the nuclear enterprise and has fallen short in its oversight of nuclear weapons policies by inadequately weighing and evaluating costs and risks.
Although Congress has tools to influence nuclear strategy and oversee the development and employment of America’s nuclear arsenal, in recent years, Congress has failed to use them effectively. For example, a recent Strategic Posture Review was conducted by a bipartisan congressional commission but failed to evaluate the key constraint at the core of congressional responsibilities: cost. As others have observed, the report “does not account for the major fiscal, logistical, and political constraints that would inhibit implementation of its recommendations.” In other examples, Congress has failed to hold hearings on the status of the severely delayed, over-budget Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (“ICBM”) program.”
Harvard Law School Journal on Legislation Volume 63.1 (Winter 2026) • Articles Rep. John Garamendi[*] | January 24, 2026 ucs.org
Abstract
Since the development of the first nuclear weapons, policymakers have been forced to grapple with the implications of their extraordinary destructive potential. Congress, with its constitutional remit on matters of war and peace, has responsibility to shape the development of policies which govern nuclear weapons, including in their acquisition and use. In the decades following the invention of nuclear weapons, Congress has at times taken active roles in oversight of nuclear weapons policy and programs in accordance with its constitutional prerogatives. However, in part due to Congress’s structure, this oversight has recently tended towards dictating programmatic minutiae rather than addressing the strategic questions about the role that nuclear weapons should play in the national security of the United States. On such an important political issue, Congress must engage in fulsome debate and take an active role in shaping policy regarding the role of nuclear weapons in our security, society, and international relations.
I. Introduction
A. The Beginning of the Modern Era
Eighty years ago, nuclear weapons were used in war for the first and only time.1 The horrific death toll made clear that nuclear weapons enabled destruction at a scale that was previously unthinkable.2 Once such destructive capabilities were available, governments faced new questions about the future of these weapons.
Nuclear weapons have unique attributes, particularly in the scale of their destructiveness, which left policymakers and military planners struggling to understand what strategic role these weapons would play in global defense.3 In democracies, where civil-military norms have often emphasized a split between political leaders who set war objectives and military leaders who manage the conduct of war, nuclear weapons posed a particular challenge by erasing the line between political and military decisions.4
Today, policymakers still grapple with these questions. I will argue that one conclusion has become increasingly clear through these debates: nuclear weapons are not merely military weapons. Their capacity to destroy makes them, by some assessments, “useless” as military implements since their use would far exceed most rational military objectives.5 They are instead “strategic” weapons whose use rests at the heart of existential political decisions for countries and their governments. As I will discuss below, these unique characteristics remain at the core of debates about their management.6