Description and Current Mission
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is one of two laboratories responsible for the design of every nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal. It was established in 1952, spearheaded by Edward Teller and Ernest O. Lawrence, to accelerate the development of the Hydrogen Bomb and to provide competition for the weapons designers at New Mexico’s Los Alamos National Laboratory.
LLNL operates on two physical sites: the Main Site, which spans 820 acres in Livermore, California (about 40 miles east of San Francisco), and Site 300, located on 7,000 acres between Livermore and Tracy, California, in a hilly region near Interstate 580.
Nuclear weapons activities have historically dominated LLNL's budget and operations. For example, in Fiscal Year 2025, almost 85 percent of the Department of Energy's (DOE) budget request for the Lab was allocated to nuclear weapons-related activities. While the University of California managed LLNL for much of its history, since 2007, the Lab has been operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. This consortium includes Bechtel National, the University of California, Babcock and Wilcox, the Washington Division of URS Corporation, and Battelle. The Laboratory employs approximately 8,000 people, with around 4,500 dedicated to National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) weapons activities.
Lawrence Livermore FY 2025 Budget Request
The Administration’s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2025 (FY25) for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been released and it tops $2.5 billion for the first time. The Lab’s overall budget is up 5% over the FY24 Annualized Continuing Resolution (a measure of the budget during 2024 which was passed in piecemeal with “continuing resolutions” every few months until March 2024.) Tri-Valley CAREs has long advocated for Livermore Lab to grow its civilian science mission and shrink its weapons focus. This year’s budget request shows that we have our work cut out for us by throwing money at the new nuclear arms race, while limiting funds for civilian sciences and cleanup projects.
Chart by Tri-Valley CARES
Currently, LLNL's activities include:
- Research, design, and development of nuclear weapons
- Assessment and certification of stockpiled weapons
- Tritium research and development
- Explosive hydrodynamic tests at the Contained Firing Facility at Site 300
- High explosives research and development
- Environmental testing of nuclear weapons to determine survivability under varied conditions
- Operation of laser facilities
- Development of capabilities to fabricate fusion and fission targets for the National Ignition Facility laser
- Design and testing of advanced technology concepts
- Biodefense experiments
National Security and Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) remains heavily focused on its nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship mission, despite the evolving global security environment that increasingly questions the reliance on nuclear deterrence. The lab's FY 2025 plan continues to prioritize life extension programs (LEPs) for aging nuclear warheads, ensuring they remain viable without actual nuclear testing. This approach perpetuates a reliance on nuclear weapons at a time when global disarmament should be a priority. Furthermore, the heavy investment in extending the life of nuclear weapons suggests a long-term commitment to maintaining a sizable arsenal, which conflicts with broader international nonproliferation goals.
Nonproliferation and Homeland Security
While LLNL is tasked with supporting nonproliferation and homeland security, its role in these areas is often overshadowed by its primary focus on nuclear weapons. The lab’s efforts to secure nuclear materials and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons knowledge are crucial, but they also highlight the inherent risks involved in the continued existence and modernization of nuclear arsenals.
Complex Transformation and High Explosives R&D
The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Complex Transformation plan significantly expands LLNL’s role in high explosives research. By designating LLNL as the "High Explosives Research & Development Center" for the entire nuclear weapons complex, the plan entrenches the lab’s focus on enhancing the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons. Critics argue that this focus on explosives development is a step backward in efforts to reduce nuclear risks globally. The proposed expansion of the High Explosives Application Facility (HEAF), which would increase the lab’s capacity to produce specialized explosive components, has sparked environmental and safety concerns. These concerns are particularly acute given the history of contamination and accidents associated with explosive research at the lab (LLNL) (LLNL Science & Technology Review).
Centers of Excellence and New Facility Developments
LLNL’s designation as a "Center of Excellence" for nuclear design and engineering reflects its central role in the ongoing modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The push to construct new facilities, such as the Weapons Engineering Science and Technology (WEST) Facility and the Materials Science Modernization Facility, underscores a deepening commitment to nuclear weapons development at a time when international pressure for disarmament is growing. The WEST facility, in particular, has faced delays and cost uncertainties, which have fueled criticism that the lab is prioritizing nuclear weapons over other scientific pursuits. These projects represent a significant investment in infrastructure that could be better spent on alternative, non-military applications of science and technology.
LLNL's Major Current and Planned Facilities
Superblock Plutonium Facility: The Plutonium Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has remained a focal point for plutonium research and stockpile management despite concerns and controversies. Despite a 2008 commitment to remove all weapons-usable plutonium by the end of 2012 due to security concerns, including a failed security test, the facility still manages plutonium for research and certification of nuclear weapons. These activities raise questions about the ongoing risk of nuclear material theft or accident.
Tritium Facility: The Tritium Facility, also located in the Superblock, has been modernized to support the National Ignition Facility (NIF – see below) and other nuclear-related experiments. While it plays a crucial role in producing tritium and hydrogen targets for fusion experiments, concerns about the facility's environmental and safety impacts persist, particularly given its role in handling hazardous materials. Despite these upgrades, the facility's expanded activities further entrench LLNL's involvement in nuclear weapons development.
National Ignition Facility (NIF): The National Ignition Facility (NIF) has been a significant point of contention. While the facility finally achieved a fusion ignition milestone in December 2022—decades behind schedule and after more than $8 billion in costs—its contribution to the Stockpile Stewardship Program has been criticized. The NIF’s failure to achieve ignition for years led to skepticism about its utility and cost-effectiveness. Critics argue that the vast expenditure, justified as necessary for maintaining the nuclear arsenal without testing, has yielded limited tangible benefits, further fueling debates about the program’s overall direction and priorities (LLNL Science & Technology Review).
High Explosives Applications Facility (HEAF): HEAF supports a wide range of high-explosives research and development activities. While its expansion under the Complex Transformation plan has increased its capacity to produce and test explosives, this has raised environmental and safety concerns, particularly as LLNL seeks to push the limits of explosive research. The planned HEAF Annex, aimed at enhancing the lab's ability to produce specialized explosive components, has sparked debate over the necessity and safety of such developments in the context of global nonproliferation goals (LLNL).
Weapons Engineering Science & Technology (WEST) Facility: The proposed WEST facility was envisioned as a centerpiece for LLNL’s role in nuclear design and engineering. However, its delayed construction and uncertain costs have cast doubt on the project’s feasibility and relevance. Critics argue that the facility’s mission—supporting nuclear weapons development—runs counter to broader disarmament efforts and may represent a misallocation of resources in an era where nuclear arms reduction should be prioritized.
Materials Science Modernization Facility: Similar to the WEST facility, the Materials Science Modernization Facility is intended to bolster LLNL’s capacity in nuclear design. However, like the WEST facility, it remains largely on the drawing board. The lack of clear timelines and funding has led to criticism that these projects may perpetuate LLNL's focus on nuclear weapons at the expense of other scientific pursuits.
Biosafety Level-3 Facility: LLNL’s BSL-3 facility, operational since 2008, has been a point of concern due to its research on bio-warfare agents. While the lab justifies this work as crucial for national security, critics worry about the potential for accidents or misuse of the research, particularly in light of the facility’s work with lethal pathogens and genetic modifications. The presence of such a facility at a site historically associated with nuclear weapons development further complicates public perceptions of LLNL’s role in both biodefense and biosecurity (LLNL).
Site 300: Site 300 remains a controversial site due to its long history of explosives testing and the associated environmental contamination. Despite efforts to clean up the site, which has been on the EPA’s Superfund list since 1990, concerns persist about the long-term environmental and health impacts of continued testing. The site still operates several open-air firing tables and the Contained Firing Facility, where hydrodynamic tests involving hazardous materials are conducted. These operations contribute to ongoing debates over the environmental costs of LLNL’s activities, especially given the site's proximity to populated areas (LLNL).
Environmental Status
Both the LLNL Main Site and Site 300 are long-standing entries on the EPA’s Superfund list, indicating significant environmental contamination that requires ongoing remediation. While progress has been made in some areas, the full cleanup is a slow and costly process. Critics argue that the lab’s continued expansion of its nuclear and explosive testing capabilities further complicates these efforts and perpetuates environmental risks (LLNL).
This integrated overview of LLNL's facilities reflects ongoing debates about the lab's role in nuclear weapons development, the environmental and security risks associated with its operations, and the broader implications for national and global security.
Overview of the Superfund Cleanup of Toxic & Radioactive Contamination at Livermore Lab
By Tri-‐Valley CAREs’ executive director, Marylia Kelley, & environmental scientist, Peter Strauss, May 2017
Nuclear weapons activities at the Livermore Lab Main Site and its Site 300 high explosives testing range have resulted in hundreds of documented toxic and radioactive releases to our air, soil, groundwater and surface waters. These activities, and the dangers they pose, are ongoing.
Both locations are federal "Superfund" sites. The EPA placed the Livermore Lab Main Site, located on East Avenue in Livermore, CA, on its list of most poisoned sites in the country in 1987. Site 300, located on Corral Hollow Road near Tracy, joined the Superfund roster in 1990.
The cleanup of contaminated soil and groundwater aquifers at both locations is complex and includes multiple and often commingled plumes of hazardous and radioactive wastes, involving uranium, tritium, volatile organic compounds, high explosives, hexavalent chromium and others. The cleanup timeframe is multi-‐generational and will take 50-‐80 years, or more.
The necessity to address this pollution more urgent then ever, due in part to federal budgetary problems, which have the effect of doing “less” environmental protection rather than “more”. Further, the Livermore Lab has delayed technical progress on the cleanup and abandoned crucial community involvement obligations.
Livermore Lab’s Main Site is just over one square mile, houses nuclear materials, and sits in a heavily populated area less than 200 feet from an earthquake fault zone. The EPA has calculated that the largest off-‐site groundwater contaminant plume could affect City water wells. If that occurs, it is estimated to result in an additional one cancer for every thousand Livermore residents drinking the water.
Site 300 essentially encompasses 2 earthquake faults. It conducts Livermore Lab’s major high explosives tests and has multiple old, unlined dumpsites with leaking radioactive and toxic wastes. Site 300 is 11 square miles and sits just west of downtown Tracy and east of Livermore. Like the Main Site, it is part of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration nuclear weapons complex. Over the years, Tracy has expanded westward toward Site 300, and a residential development of 5,500 homes was recently approved near Site 300.
Since it was founded in 1955, Site 300 operations have included open-‐air blasts with high explosives and multiple toxic and radioactive materials used in nuclear weapons. Current operations include contained detonations, open-‐air blasts, explosive and hazardous waste burning, and radioactive and hazardous waste storage. Prevailing winds blow contamination into the Central Valley, and, particularly, to Tracy.
At Site 300, the EPA estimated the risk of drinking the water at pumped from wells at the fence line of this 11 square mile site was estimated to result in one cancer for every hundred people.
In addition groundwater is used for irrigation near both of these sites. While we have not yet seen farmers trading off the risks of using contaminated water to grow food, that day may come unless there is a continued effort by Livermore Lab to contain and clean up the groundwater contaminant plumes.
After years of cleanup these risks have decreased; nevertheless it is still urgent that all potential drinking water be cleaned up. However, at the Main Site and Site 300, the Superfund cleanup process has gotten off-‐track, and too many decisions are being made informally and out of public view. The power of our voices is a vitally needed antidote to bureaucratic inertia and the pollution lurking in our environment.
Lab's "Public Involvement" is Broken
At the Main Site, Livermore Lab has not held a meeting of its official "Community Work Group" to oversee Superfund cleanup decisions for nearly five years. The public is being systematically excluded. At Site 300, a pressing problem is the lack of any official process to involve the public in Superfund cleanup decisions. There is no "Community Work Group."
Tri-‐Valley CAREs’ Goals for Public Participation and Cleanup
Our overall aim is to improve the quality and quantity of the Superfund cleanup at the Livermore Lab Main Site and Site 300. We believe that the remedy choices and cleanup levels chosen must reflect the entire community's input, not just that of the polluter and the federal and state regulatory agencies. The public that bears the health risks must be given the tools and the opportunities to decide "how clean is clean?" and which technologies for conducting the cleanup are acceptable. Because the cleanup has taken so long, and is projected to last until the beginning of the next century, Livermore Lab needs to develop plans that inform and involve the community, so that community concerns are not overlooked.
The solution is to strengthen the overall participation of community residents in Superfund decision-‐ making. We at Tri-‐Valley CAREs can help by conducting outreach to Spanish speakers, instituting an environmentally focused Youth Video Contest and other student activities, and conducting workshops and community meetings, such as the one we are planning this fall in Tracy. And, we have instituted a Tracy Superfund Advisory Committee. That said, we must also continue to insist that, as the polluter, Livermore Lab steps up to its public engagement responsibilities more fully.
Key Questions for the Future
Along with renewed public involvement, there is a need to improve the management of pollutants and the cleanup technologies used at the Main Site and Site 300.
At the Main Site, the Lab has deferred completing a focused feasibility study to address the commingling of radioactive tritium and chlorinated solvents. Presently there is no role for the community in remedy selection. Moreover, there are several "pilot projects" underway requiring greater community oversight.
They involve bio-‐remediation, injection of zero-‐valent iron, and in-‐situ thermal treatment of contaminants. Decisions will be made about where and when to use these technologies. Residents need to be at the table.
At Site 300, there is incomplete characterization of contaminants in soils, particularly in two areas used for bomb design tests involving depleted uranium, or DU, as well as issues concerning high explosive contamination of soils and groundwater. The remedial investigation/feasibility study to determine the best DU cleanup technology and the cleanup levels to be attained is lagging behind schedule and lacking any regular public involvement process.