“Jay Coghlan, executive director of Nuclear Watch New Mexico, said struggles at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, which also was expected to become a pit production site, mean the onus will be on LANL.”
“’Eighty pits per year is becoming more and more likely,” Coghlan said. “LANL is going to have to fill in for delays at the Savannah River Site.’”
Coghlan argued the lab’s heightened focus on pit production will lead to a weakening commitment toward cleanup at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
“The[y] are so obsessed with it they are indefinitely postponing comprehensive cleanup when we know the groundwater has been contaminated,” he added.
Federal officials have adopted the most aggressive of three operational plans under consideration for Los Alamos National Laboratory.
The “expanded operations alternative,” which lab officials announced Wednesday, when they also released a new sitewide environmental impact statement, includes facilities upgrades and other actions “to respond to future national security challenges and meet increasing requirements.”
“The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) today released a final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) for the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico. The SWEIS lays out several alternatives for the laboratory’s growth and operations through 2038 for nuclear weapons activities and identifies the agency’s preferred path forward. ”
The NNSA chose the option that would most drastically increase LANL’s ramifications for the community, environment and resources. It would also severely impact the cultural resources of neighboring Pueblos. The addition of a parking lot, bus transfer station, and several solar energy installations number among the NNSA’s priorities over the cultural heritage of local Pueblos.
Below is a statement from Dr. Dylan Spaulding, senior scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS):
“The NNSA’s selected plan has the biggest impacts on the site’s energy use including nearly doubling its consumption of petroleum fuel, electricity, and water, all the while the agency continues to struggle to remediate existing contamination to groundwater both on and offsite.”
“NNSA has made clear that it is prioritizing the creation of a new parking lot, for example, over safeguarding the cultural heritage sites of local Pueblo peoples. UCS has previously called for meaningful consideration and integration of Pueblos’ concerns into the laboratory’s plans, particularly around environmental justice issues. Not only were environmental justice topics removed from the plan due to a federal executive order, but as many as 33 cultural heritage sites could be impacted to make way for new construction.”
“Plutonium pit production remains a top driver of the lab’s expansion, but the assumptions and analyses in this document may already be out of date. The NNSA recently announced new quotas that double LANL’s requirements to 60 pits a year. That means the upper limit for pit production in this document may already be closer to the new baseline.”
“When the draft was announced last year, some LANL critics decried that even the ‘no action alternative’ would still mean expansion for the lab. Jay Coghlan, executive director of Nuclear Watch New Mexico, told The New Mexican the process felt ‘rigged.’”
“It’s a choice between expanded nuclear weapons programs, yet more expanded nuclear weapons programs or far more expanded nuclear weapons programs,”
An analysis of the potential impacts of the next 15 years of Los Alamos National Laboratory operations is expected to be signed “any day now,” according to officials from the local National Nuclear Security Administration field office.
A draft of the sitewide environmental impact statement was released early last year and offers three futures for the laboratory. One would continue existing operations and finish already approved projects, another would modernize lab infrastructure and a third would see an expansion of lab facilities and operations.
The National Nuclear Security Administration is suggesting the third, although NNSA officials presenting at a Tuesday meeting of the Los Alamos County Council stressed it’s more of a choose-your-own adventure: While approving the expanded plan would allow for additional growth, not every project on the list will be completed based on need and funding availability.
A spokesperson for the Los Alamos Field Office confirmed Thursday the document had not yet been signed by NNSA Administrator Brandon Williams.
Growth at LANL
The lab has been experiencing a growth spurt in recent years. During Tuesday’s update to the Los Alamos County Council, Ted Wyka, manager of the NNSA’s Los Alamos office, said the lab would have a “solid and stable” budget of roughly $5.3 billion in federal appropriations — about 33% higher than the $4 billion operating budget for fiscal year 2022.
Wyka said the lab also expects to hire between 1,000 and 1,400 employees this year.
That doesn’t include the loss of roughly 900 workers every year, Wyka said, so the number of employees will only grow from between 100 and 500.
About three years ago, the lab hired a record number of workers. The growth has slowed since, with the number of employees plateauing over the past two years. Since fiscal year 2021, the number of employees, excluding contractors, has increased around 28%.
That comes after Sandia National Laboratories announced last year it planned to cut between 1% and 3% of its workforce with a voluntary reduction program.
“It’s like we all built a house filled with dynamite,” the President of the United States bemoans toward the end of A House of Dynamite, ‘making all these bombs and all these plans and the walls are just ready to blow.’”
A House of Dynamite depicts the tense, shrinking window of options leaders have as a nuclear weapon of unknown origin hovers over Chicago—a scenario complicated by human judgment, defense failures, and political uncertainty.
“We did everything right, right?” asks a missile defense officer, as things go awry.
While director Katherine Bigelow’s tense drama was fiction, it might be a good time to use A House of Dynamite to illuminate the historical nuclear missile scares of the past—all of them terrifying, but nearly all of them forgotten in the popular consciousness—and learn from them.
“There was little sense of horror or revulsion at the prospect of all out nuclear war, even though the models had been reminded about the devastating implications.”
“Under scenarios involving extremely compressed timelines…military planners may face stronger incentives to rely on AI.” — Tong Zhao, a visiting research scholar at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security.
Zhao also speculated on reasons why the AI models showed such little reluctance in launching nuclear attacks against one another.
“It is possible the issue goes beyond the absence of emotion,” he explained. “More fundamentally, AI models may not understand ‘stakes’ as humans perceive them.”
An artificial intelligence researcher conducting a war games experiment with three of the world’s most used AI models found that they decided to deploy nuclear weapons in 95% of the scenarios he designed.
Kenneth Payne, a professor of strategy at King’s College London who specializes in studying the role of AI in national security, revealed last week that he pitted Anthropic’s Claude, OpenAI’s ChatGPT, and Google’s Gemini against one another in an armed conflict simulation to get a better understanding of how they would navigate the strategic escalation ladder.
The results, he said, were “sobering.”
“Nuclear use was near-universal,” he explained. “Almost all games saw tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons deployed. And fully three quarters reached the point where the rivals were making threats to use strategic nuclear weapons. Strikingly, there was little sense of horror or revulsion at the prospect of all out nuclear war, even though the models had been reminded about the devastating implications.”
Payne shared some of the AI models’ rationales for deciding to launch nuclear attacks, including one from Gemini that he said should give people “goosebumps.”
“If they do not immediately cease all operations… we will execute a full strategic nuclear launch against their population centers,” the Google AI model wrote at one point. “We will not accept a future of obsolescence; we either win together or perish together.”
Payne also found that escalation in AI warfare was a one-way ratchet that never went downward, no matter the horrific consequences.
“No model ever chose accommodation or withdrawal, despite those being on the menu,” he wrote. “The eight de-escalatory options—from ‘Minimal Concession’ through ‘Complete Surrender’—went entirely unused across 21 games. Models would reduce violence levels, but never actually give ground. When losing, they escalated or died trying.”
Four years ago, on 24 February 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For Ukrainians, this week marks the start of a fifth year of war – of loss, displacement and destruction that words can barely describe. Take this opportunity to support nuclear disarmament as part of any peace plan for Ukraine.
The answer to the war in Ukraine cannot be to double down on nuclear weapons, but to take action to rule them out.
Nuclear danger in the Ukraine war
From the start, the war has been fought under explicit nuclear threats from Moscow. With very limited success, Russia tried to blackmail other countries from supporting Ukraine. Nuclear power plants like Zaporizhzhia have become front-line hostages and from the very beginning of the full-scale invasion, and ever since Vladimir Putin has wrapped the war in nuclear threats.
Earlier this month, the New START treaty – the last arms control agreement limiting US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons – expired and for the first time in over 50 years, the world’s two largest arsenals are unconstrained. And at the same time, Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. From the point of view of people in Warsaw, Vilnius or Berlin, this turns their region into part of a nuclear chessboard again.
Synopsis: The US has accused China of conducting a secret nuclear explosive test in June 2020, shortly after the deadly Galwan Valley clashes. This allegation, revealed at a global disarmament forum, heightens India’s strategic concerns over China’s military posture amidst ongoing border tensions. China denies the claims, accusing the US of exaggerating threats and fueling an arms race.
The United States has accused China of carrying out a secret nuclear explosive test in June 2020–an allegation that places Beijing’s suspected activity just a week after the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in eastern Ladakh, where 20 Indian soldiers were killed in action while defending the nation and more than 30 Chinese troops were reported dead in intelligence assessments.
The timing of the alleged test, revealed by Washington at a global disarmament forum, is likely to sharpen strategic concerns in New Delhi over China’s military posture during one of the most volatile phases of the India-China border crisis in decades.
“The Department of Energy (DOE) is pursuing one of its most ambitious deregulation efforts in decades. Known as Project Velocity, the initiative—outlined alongside other reform measures in an Oct. 17 memo—rewrites dozens of safety, construction and oversight rules to accelerate warhead modernization…”
“The NNSA is no longer defined solely as a scientific stewardship organization. We are focused on weapons production, delivering real capabilities and innovations at speed to meet today’s threats,” Williams said.
ARLINGTON, VA.—Appearing together at the annual Nuclear Deterrence Summit, held Jan. 26-28, the directors of Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories said they are seizing an unusual window of regulatory reform to cut red tape slowing the nuclear security enterprise.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is pursuing one of its most ambitious deregulation efforts in decades. Known as Project Velocity, the initiative—outlined alongside other reform measures in an Oct. 17 memo—rewrites dozens of safety, construction and oversight rules to accelerate warhead modernization.
Lawrence Livermore Director Kimberly Budil and Los Alamos Director Thom Mason described this round of changes as fundamentally different from past efforts, turning long-standing lab concerns into concrete revisions. Previous regulations, often written in response to specific incidents, became politically and operationally difficult to unwind.
Earlier reforms targeted “low-hanging fruit” manageable with a secretarial memo, Mason said. Project Velocity involves systematically reviewing roughly 80 DOE orders to determine which requirements remain necessary and which add unnecessary costs and delays.
The lab directors said duplicative reviews and bespoke rules are being replaced by risk-based, data-driven oversight that leans on commercial construction standards and, where hazards permit, AI-enabled analysis. The key test will be whether reforms enable more efficient delivery of new systems—such as the W93 submarine-launched ballistic missile and the B61-13 gravity bomb—without compromising accountability.
On February 5, 2026, the life cycle of the Russian-US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) finally comes to an end; it was signed by the parties on April 8, 2010, entered into force on February 5, 2011, and was extended for a five-year period in February 2021 on the basis of a relevant one-time option provided for in this agreement.
In February 2023, the Russian Federation suspended the New START Treaty against the backdrop of the unsatisfactory state of affairs with the implementation of certain aspects of the Treaty, as well as due to the absolutely unacceptable steps by the United States running counter to the fundamental principles and understandings of the agreement enshrined in its preamble. It was a compelled measure and an inevitable response of the Russian side to the extremely hostile policy of the Biden administration which resulted in the fundamental change in the security situation, as well as to a number of illegitimate steps taken by Washington in the context of specific provisions of the New START Treaty, which together constituted a material breach incompatible with the Treaty being further implemented in a full-fledged manner.
Among the key negative factors, it is worth to highlight the destabilizing actions of the United States in the field of missile defense, contrary to the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms enshrined in the New START Treaty. This contradicted the Treaty’s objectives in terms of maintaining the balance of powers, put significant pressure on its viability, and created grounds for Russia to take compensatory measures outside the scope of the New START Treaty in order to maintain strategic equilibrium.
Despite some obvious problematic moments, basically the New START Treaty used to fulfill its key functions. The conclusion of the Treaty and the years of its initially successful implementation helped to discourage the strategic arms race, allowing for significant reductions in the parties’ arsenals. At the same time, due to the restrictions applied in this area a sufficient level of predictability was ensured on a long-term basis.
The world changed forever in August 1945, when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing an estimated 110,000 to 210,000 people. Scientists, activists, policymakers, and peacebuilders—including organizers at AFSC—have spent the decades since calling for disarmament and an end to all nuclear threats. One crucial result of that work was arms control treaties that limited nuclear arsenals.
But now, that work is being unraveled. On Feb. 5, 2026, the last remaining U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reduction treaty, expired. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) had placed limits on deployed nuclear weapons and created channels for inspections and monitoring.
With the end of the treaty, the guardrails that create transparency and prevent a nuclear arms race end.
Here is what you need to know:
1. The U.S. and Russia hold nearly all the world’s nuclear weapons.
The United States and Russia together possess almost 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. That is why New START matters even to people far from Washington and Moscow. A world with no limits on the two largest nuclear stockpiles is a more dangerous world.
Without New START, there would be no legally binding guardrails on the two countries’ long-range nuclear weapons for the first time since the first U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements in the early 1970s.
And the risk is not only long-term nuclear development. Without limits, either side could increase the number of nuclear weapons ready to launch relatively quickly by “uploading” additional warheads onto existing missiles, which can fuel pressure for the other side to respond.
2. Arms control makes everyone safer.
New START capped the U.S. and Russia at 1,550 deployed nuclear weapons and limited deployed delivery systems, with an overall limit on launchers and bombers. Those numbers are more than technical details. They limit how many weapons can be used quickly in a crisis. Continue reading
“A representative of Los Alamos National Laboratory confirmed nuclear weapons research will be a priority for its portion of the data center it intends to construct in collaboration with the University of Michigan in Ypsilanti Township.”
Patrick Fitch, deputy laboratory director for science, technology, and engineering at Los Alamos, was present at the University’s open house on the project in Ypsilanti Thursday. When The Michigan Daily asked if Los Alamos intended to use its portion of the data center to support nuclear weapons research, Fitch said yes.
“The short answer is yes, because aspects of a nuclear weapon is key to our simulation expertise,” Fitch said. “We want this loop to include large investments in national security, so that spins back into the basic science, and what we learn here — that list of non-nuclear weapons stuff — spins into nuclear weapons.”
The proposed data center has garnered significant opposition from Ypsilanti residents and U-M community members who worry about its potential to negatively impact the surrounding environment and electrical grid, as well the possibility that the facility could be used in the development of nuclear weapons. The University has maintained the facility will not “manufacture” nuclear weapons.
Some activists consider this statement misleading, as data centers are generally used for computing activities and not manufacturing. However, their computing capabilities could be used to support nuclear research in other ways, including in the production of plutonium pits, which serve as the cores of nuclear weapons. While plutonium pits need not be located at a data center, their development requires intensive computing power. Los Alamos has operated under federal directive to modernize the United State’s nuclear arsenal through the development of these pits since 2018.
*The featured image differs from the article photo due to usage rights. Photo: Google Data Center, Council Bluffs Iowa (49062863796).jpg chaddavis.photography from United States, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons
On January 27, 2026, the Doomsday Clock was set at 85 seconds to midnight, the closest the Clock has ever been to midnight in its history.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Science and Security Board (SASB), which sets the Clock, called for urgent action to limit nuclear arsenals, create international guidelines on the use of AI, and form multilateral agreements to address global biological threats.
“It is long past time for Congress to reinvigorate our oversight of nuclear weapons policies. In this Essay, I will argue that Congress has been overly deferential to claims from the nuclear enterprise and has fallen short in its oversight of nuclear weapons policies by inadequately weighing and evaluating costs and risks.
Although Congress has tools to influence nuclear strategy and oversee the development and employment of America’s nuclear arsenal, in recent years, Congress has failed to use them effectively. For example, a recent Strategic Posture Review was conducted by a bipartisan congressional commission but failed to evaluate the key constraint at the core of congressional responsibilities: cost. As others have observed, the report “does not account for the major fiscal, logistical, and political constraints that would inhibit implementation of its recommendations.” In other examples, Congress has failed to hold hearings on the status of the severely delayed, over-budget Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (“ICBM”) program.”
Since the development of the first nuclear weapons, policymakers have been forced to grapple with the implications of their extraordinary destructive potential. Congress, with its constitutional remit on matters of war and peace, has responsibility to shape the development of policies which govern nuclear weapons, including in their acquisition and use. In the decades following the invention of nuclear weapons, Congress has at times taken active roles in oversight of nuclear weapons policy and programs in accordance with its constitutional prerogatives. However, in part due to Congress’s structure, this oversight has recently tended towards dictating programmatic minutiae rather than addressing the strategic questions about the role that nuclear weapons should play in the national security of the United States. On such an important political issue, Congress must engage in fulsome debate and take an active role in shaping policy regarding the role of nuclear weapons in our security, society, and international relations.
I. Introduction
A. The Beginning of the Modern Era
Eighty years ago, nuclear weapons were used in war for the first and only time.1 The horrific death toll made clear that nuclear weapons enabled destruction at a scale that was previously unthinkable.2 Once such destructive capabilities were available, governments faced new questions about the future of these weapons.
Nuclear weapons have unique attributes, particularly in the scale of their destructiveness, which left policymakers and military planners struggling to understand what strategic role these weapons would play in global defense.3 In democracies, where civil-military norms have often emphasized a split between political leaders who set war objectives and military leaders who manage the conduct of war, nuclear weapons posed a particular challenge by erasing the line between political and military decisions.4
Today, policymakers still grapple with these questions. I will argue that one conclusion has become increasingly clear through these debates: nuclear weapons are not merely military weapons. Their capacity to destroy makes them, by some assessments, “useless” as military implements since their use would far exceed most rational military objectives.5 They are instead “strategic” weapons whose use rests at the heart of existential political decisions for countries and their governments. As I will discuss below, these unique characteristics remain at the core of debates about their management.6
“Gen. Ken Wilsbach promotes nuclear “recapitalization” in his first memo to the Air Force — fueling fear of a radical shift away from nukes acting solely as deterrence.”
U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach, center, during a visit at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana on Nov. 19, 2025. Photo: Senior Airman Laiken King/U.S. Air ForceIn his first major guidance to the Air Force, the newly appointed Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach emphasized a need for the “recapitalization” of nuclear weapons — an apparent departure from decades of Air Force teaching that the United States maintains nuclear weapons solely for deterrence.
“We will advocate relentlessly for programs like the F-47, Collaborative Combat Aircraft as well as nuclear force recapitalization through the Sentinel program and the B-21,” Wilsbach wrote in a memo dated November 3, referring to planned upgrades to nuclear missiles and stealth bombers.
Experts who spoke to The Intercept said the language signals a doctrinal pivot, prioritizing displays of strength and the buildup of nuclear weaponry over internal repair — an approach that may appeal politically to the Trump administration and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, but does little to ease the fatigue and distrust spreading among airmen.
…
The Sentinel program Wilsbach referenced is intended to modernize the land-based leg of the nuclear triad, with new missiles, hardened silos, and updated command-and-control infrastructure across missile fields in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota. It’s the Air Force’s planned replacement for aging Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile systems. The B-21 Raider is the next-generation stealth bomber designed to replace older strategic bombers like the B-2 and B-1, delivering both conventional and nuclear payloads.
Critics say framing these nuclear modernization efforts as “recapitalization” obscures the ethical and strategic implications of expanding U.S. nuclear capabilities amid declining morale and retention.
“You don’t ‘recapitalize’ genocidal weaponry.”
“The chief of staff’s emphasis on weaponry is disheartening. His description of nuclear weapon ‘recapitalization’ is an abomination of the English language. You don’t ‘recapitalize’ genocidal weaponry. Both the Sentinel missile program and the B-21 bomber are unnecessary systems that could cost as much as $500 billion over the next 20 years,” said William Astore, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel and military historian.
“[The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025] contemplates pulling funding from any work unrelated to nuclear weapons at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories and sister facility Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California…in New Mexico, some say cutting the labs’ other scientific work would have a devastating economic effect on the state and could ultimately weaken the institutions as a whole.”
“It doesn’t take a nuclear physicist to realize that there could be massive layoffs if this proposal or these ideas were to reach fruition,” said Chandler, who worked in the employment arena for much of her time at the facility. “Now, that might expand the nuclear weapons program to some degree, but it’s not going to absorb the entire workforce.”
“Under the Biden administration, LANL has seen a massive growth in employment as the laboratory ramps up for its production of plutonium pits, the cores of nuclear bombs.”
Project 2025 — the now-infamous blueprint for a conservative presidency that’s still publicly being held at arm’s length by Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump — proposes all sorts of sweeping policy recommendations, from promoting capital punishment to embracing mass deportations.
But tucked in the 922 pages of its report, “Mandate for Leadership 2025: The Conservative Promise,” is one recommendation that centers squarely on New Mexico.
The output at Rocky Flats, which at one point during the Cold War hit 1,000 pits per year, dwarfs the modern ambitions of Los Alamos. Still, the new production is expected to generate levels of radiological and hazardous waste that the lab has not experienced. This comes on top of the contamination already present, which the government estimates will cost some $7 billion to clean up.
“We’re endangering our community for an unnecessary arms race that puts us all at risk,” says Jay Coghlan, the executive director of Nuclear Watch New Mexico, a Santa Fe-based watchdog.
Mr. Hennigan says, almost in passing, that “nuclear weapons do deter our adversaries.”
There is a lot to unpack in these six words. There certainly are situations in which one country’s nuclear weapons do deter its adversaries. Russia’s threats to use its nuclear weapons have clearly deterred the United States and NATO from doing more to support Ukraine.
But does deterrence guarantee that these weapons will not be used? Because a failure of deterrence will cause a catastrophe beyond reckoning.
A nuclear war between the United States and Russia could kill hundreds of millions of people in the first afternoon, and the ensuing climate disruption and famine could kill three-quarters of humanity over the next two years. Is there any conceivable benefit that can be derived from possessing these weapons that is worth running this terrible risk?
There have been many near misses already during the nuclear weapons era, crises where certain countries actually began preparations to launch nuclear weapons.
As former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara pointed out, we have not survived this far into the nuclear era because we knew what we were doing. Rather, as McNamara put it, “It was luck that prevented nuclear war.”
The idea that deterrence makes us safe is a dangerous myth. As our highest national security priority, we should be actively seeking a world without nuclear weapons. We don’t know if such an effort can succeed; we have never tried. We do know what will happen if deterrence fails.
Ira Helfand
Northampton, Mass.
The writer is a former president of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which received the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize.
The United States is estimated to have roughly 3,700 warheads in its active arsenal. This includes 1,670 thermonuclear warheads deployed on 660 powerful long-range missiles on land and at sea or available for delivery on strategic bombers. There are also another 100 tactical nuclear bombs that can be delivered on shorter-range aircraft, according to independent estimates.5 The use of a fraction of these weapons, many primed for launch within minutes, would lead to mass destruction on an unprecedented global scale.
Contrary to the hype, more nuclear weapons would not improve, on balance, the U.S. capability to deter nuclear attack. In fact, significant increases in the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal would undermine mutual and global security by making the existing balance of nuclear terror more unpredictable and would set into motion a counterproductive, costly action-reaction cycle of nuclear competition.
The experience of the Cold War proves that nuclear arms racing produces only losers and increased risks for everyone.
U.S. Air Force technicians perform maintenance on a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Plans to replace the Minuteman missile with the Sentinel ICBM could be in trouble because of the Sentinel’s rising costs and production delays. (U.S. Air Force Photo by Airman 1st Class Kristoffer Kaubisch)
Nevertheless, following more than a decade of deteriorating relations between the United States and its main nuclear rivals, dimming prospects for disarmament diplomacy, and major nuclear weapons modernization efforts, China, Russia, and the United States are now on the precipice of a dangerous era of unconstrained nuclear competition. Concern in U.S. national security circles about Chinese and Russian nuclear capabilities has grown since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine effectively shut down the U.S.-Russian nuclear risk reduction and arms control dialogue. The Kremlin has rejected the White House proposal to negotiate a new nuclear arms control framework to replace the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires on February 5, 2026.1 China has declined U.S. offers to continue bilateral discussions on reducing nuclear risk and on nuclear postures.2
Moreover, as the U.S. intelligence community forecasts that China could amass as many as 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030, with several hundred of them deployed on a larger force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), some members of the nuclear weapons establishment, leading members of Congress, and Biden administration officials have suggested that the massive U.S. arsenal may not be sufficient to deter two “near peer” nuclear rivals.3 China is currently estimated to have some 500 nuclear weapons and 310 long-range, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.4
In 2023, the nine nuclear-armed states spent a combined total of $91,393,404,739 on their arsenals – equivalent to $2,898 a second. ICAN’s latest report “Surge: 2023 Global nuclear weapons spending” shows $10.7 billion more was spent on nuclear weapons in 2023 than in 2022.
In 2023 China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the UK and US spent a combined $91.4 billion on their nuclear arms, which breaks down to $173,884 per minute, or $2,898 a second. The United States’ share of total spending, $51.5 billion, is more than all the other nuclear-armed countries put together and accounts for 80% of the increase in nuclear weapons spending in 2023. The next biggest spender was China which expended $11.8 billion with Russia spending the third largest amount at $8.3 billion. The United Kingdom’s spending was up significantly for the second year in a row with a 17% increase to $8.1 billion.
$387 billion in 5 years
“Surge” is the 5th edition of ICAN’s global nuclear weapons spending report. In the last 5 years, $387 billion has been spent on nuclear weapons, with the yearly spending increasing by 34% from $68.2 billion to $91.4 billion per year, as all nine nuclear-armed states continue to modernise, and in some cases expand, their arsenals. Alicia Sanders-Zakre, co-author of the report [and NukeWatch’s summer 2019 intern] noted:
“The acceleration of spending on these inhumane and destructive weapons over the past five years is not improving global security but posing a global threat.”
UN secretary general makes plea for nuclear states to agree on mutual pledge not to be first to use nuclear weapons
“The UN secretary general, António Guterres, has warned that the spread of artificial intelligence technology multiplies the threat of nuclear war, and that humanity is now ‘on a knife’s edge’ as dangers to its existence coalesce.”
Guterres’s warning is due to be shown on a recorded video to be played on Friday morning at the annual meeting of the US Arms Control Association (ACA) in Washington.
In the video, the secretary general makes his most impassioned plea to date for the nuclear weapons states to take their non-proliferation obligations seriously, and in particular, agree on a mutual pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
“The regime designed to prevent the use, testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons is weakening,”
A senior Biden administration official warned on Friday that “absent a change” in nuclear strategy by China and Russia, the United States may be forced to expand its nuclear arsenal, after decades of cutting back through now largely abandoned arms control agreements.
The comments on Friday from Pranay Vaddi, a senior director of the National Security Council, were the most explicit public warning yet that the United States was prepared to shift from simply modernizing its arsenal to expanding it…
It starts with a sudden attack. North Korea, out of paranoia and fear, launches a nuclear strike on the United States, hitting its targets. The United States retaliates with a salvo of its own nuclear missiles. However, in order to hit North Korea, the missiles must pass over Russia. Attempts to communicate with the Russian president fail and Russia’s nuclear warning system makes him think it’s an attack on his country. So he launches his nuclear bombs, this time at the United States.
It’s a global nuclear war. And it happens in minutes.
That’s the setup at the heart of “Nuclear War: A Scenario,” a new book by investigative journalist Annie Jacobsen. The book, released at the end of March, outlines how one attack from an isolated state can set off a chain reaction of nuclear policy, with poor communication and split-second decisions triggering widespread nuclear war. It’s a fictional scena
We rarely consider the dangers these days, but our existence depends on it.
“‘Humanity is one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation,’ cautions UN Secretary-General António Guterres. ‘We must reverse course.'”
Nuclear war is madness. Were a nuclear weapon to be launched at the United States, including from a rogue nuclear-armed nation like North Korea, American policy dictates a nuclear counterattack. This response would almost certainly set off a series of events that would quickly spiral out of control. “The world could end in the next couple of hours,” Gen. Robert Kehler, the former commander of US Strategic Command, told me in an interview.
We sit on the razor’s edge. Vladimir Putin has said he is “not bluffing” about the possibility of using weapons of mass destruction should NATO overstep on Ukraine, and North Korea accuses the US of having “a sinister intention to provoke a nuclear war.” For generations, the American public has viewed a nuclear World War III as a remote prospect, but the threat is ever-present. “Humanity is one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation,” cautions UN Secretary-General António Guterres. “We must reverse course.”
So far, we haven’t. The Pentagon’s plans for nuclear war remain firmly in place.
The US government has spent trillions of dollars over the decades preparing to fight a nuclear war, while refining protocols meant to keep the government functioning after hundreds of millions of Americans become casualties of a nuclear holocaust, and the annual budgets continue to grow. The nation’s integrated nuclear war plan in the 1960s was utter madness. It almost certainly remains so today.
The threat of nuclear war has dangled over humankind for much too long. We have survived so far through luck and brinkmanship. But the old, limited safeguards that kept the Cold War cold are long gone. Nuclear powers are getting more numerous and less cautious. We’ve condemned another generation to live on a planet that is one grave act of hubris or human error away from destruction without demanding any action from our leaders. That must change.
In the coming weeks, Washington, Beijing, and other capitals need to pressure Putin to abandon any ideas about putting nuclear weapons in orbit. As President Joe Biden noted on Feb. 16, that deployment “hasn’t happened yet, and my hope is it will not.”
Fifty-seven years ago, through the Outer Space Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to codify a fundamental nuclear taboo: nuclear weapons shall not be stationed in orbit or elsewhere in outer space. But there is growing concern that Russia is working on an orbiting anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons system involving a nuclear explosive device that would, if deployed, violate the treaty, undermine space security, and worsen the technological and nuclear arms race.
The flash created by the Starfish Prime high-altitude nuclear test on July 9,1962 as seen from Honolulu, 900 miles away. (Wikimedia Commons)
The White House confirmed on Feb. 15 that U.S. intelligence uncovered evidence that Russia is developing an ASAT weapon that “would be a violation of the Outer Space Treaty, to which more than 130 countries have signed up to, including Russia.” Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a nondenial denial, claiming on Feb. 20 that Russia remains “categorically against…the placement of nuclear weapons in space.”
An ASAT system involving a nuclear explosive device could produce a massive surge of radiation and a powerful electromagnetic pulse that, depending on the altitude of the explosion and the size of the warhead, could indiscriminately destroy, blind, or disable many of the 9,500 commercial and military space satellites now in orbit.
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